Decision-Making and Depressive Symptomatology by Yan Leykin et al.
ORIGINAL ARTICLE
Decision-Making and Depressive Symptomatology
Yan Leykin • Carolyn Sewell Roberts •
Robert J. DeRubeis
Published online: 4 May 2010
 The Author(s) 2010. This article is published with open access at Springerlink.com
Abstract Difficulty making decisions is a core symptom
of depressive illness, but the nature of these difficulties has
not been well characterized. The two studies presented
herein use the same hypothetical scenarios that call for a
decision. In Study 1, participants were asked to make and
explain their decisions in a free-response format, as well as
to describe their prior experiences with similar situations.
The results suggest that those with more depressive
symptoms make decisions that are less likely to further
their interests. We also identified several interesting asso-
ciations between features of decision-making and the
presence of depressive symptoms. In Study 2, participants
were guided through their decisions with simple decision
tools to investigate whether the association between
depressive symptoms and poor decisions is better accoun-
ted for by failure to use of good decision-making strategies,
or by other factors, such as differences in priorities or
goals. With this minimal intervention the quality of deci-
sions no longer declined significantly as a function of
depressive symptom severity. Moreover, few associations
between depressive symptom severity and decision-related
goals and priorities were evident, suggesting that the pre-
viously-exposed difficulties of depressed individuals with
decision-making were largely the result of their failure to
use effective decision-making techniques.
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Introduction
Depressed individuals have difficulties making decisions
(e.g., Klerman 1980; Nezu and Perri 1989). Indecisiveness
is a symptom common enough in depressed individuals to
have been included in the criteria for the disorder (APA
2000). The choices made by depressed persons may also be
sub-optimal. Studies have shown that depressed, relative to
non-depressed persons, make qualitatively different deci-
sions (Chambers et al. 1996; Kulin et al. 1998; Suri et al.
2004), leading many doctors and psychotherapists to sug-
gest to their patients that they should avoid making major
life choices while in a depressed state.
Good decision-making happens when rational thinking is
followed by the enactment of a decision that maximizes
utility. Rational thinking involves the ability to understand
and evaluate alternatives, to make judgments that are rela-
tively free of biases, and appropriately appraise the conse-
quences of decisions. Compared to other possible outcomes,
the outcomes of the most productive decisions have the
highest utility (subjective value, or goodness, e.g., Bell et al.
1988) to the decision-maker. However, because utility
judgments can be influenced by factors such as strong
emotions or incorrect predictions of future preferences
(Loewenstein et al. 2003), making the most productive
choice is often difficult. Biased utility judgments may lead to
the selection of a suboptimal alternative and the failure to
maximize experienced utility (Kahneman et al. 1997).
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The pessimistic thinking style of depressed individuals
may result in a heightened sense of potential disappoint-
ment in the expected outcome. The expectations of nega-
tive emotions such as regret and disappointment may carry
a significant disutility (Bell 1982; Loomes and Sudgen
1982). A tendency to anticipate disappointment may result
in choices that appear to the decision-maker to be optimal
at the time they are made but which will, over time, prove
not to be in the person’s ultimate best interest. For exam-
ple, a person may turn down a promotion due to an over-
riding concern that one is incapable of handling the
responsibility, the expectation of disappointment at the
possible subsequent demotion, or simply a ‘‘bad feeling’’
about the situation. A good decision is thus the one that has
the most ‘‘lifetime’’ utility, that is, the one that provides the
most good for the person over time.
There are several lines of theory and research that
suggest that depression is associated with maladaptive
decision making. The ‘‘portfolio theory’’ proposed by
Leahy (1999, 2000, 2001, 2002) represents a broad
description of psychopathological decision-making. Bor-
rowing from Economics, the portfolio theory focuses on
the ‘‘individual’s perception of his or her resources, ability
to produce future resources, diversification, emphasis on
maximization of rewards or minimization of costs, poten-
tial for regret, hedonic utility for gains and losses, and risk-
tolerance’’ (Leahy 2001, p. 343). Leahy has found that
depressed persons maintain a negatively biased portfolio,
with beliefs that they possess few assets and low future
potential, and that they use a risk-averse approach in which
expected losses are minimized at the expense of potential
pleasure from possible gains.
A number of psychological factors that affect decision-
making have also been found to be altered in those with
depressive symptoms. For instance, risk aversion was
demonstrated in depressed individuals by Murphy et al.
(2001). Participants engaged in a task that required them to
select a ‘‘winning’’ box, with known probability of wins
per box, and to bet a limited amount of ‘‘money’’ on a box
they expected to win. Although depressed subjects were as
likely as the controls to choose the winning boxes, they
took longer to decide on a winning box, and won less
money due to a tendency to increase their bets at a lower
rate, compared to controls. Depressed subjects were thus
more cautious in their decisions, and therefore took fewer
risks.
Listlessness and passivity, symptoms frequently
observed in depression, are likely to affect decision-mak-
ing. Depressed individuals also commonly exhibit hope-
lessness (Abramson et al. 1989) and helplessness
(Abramson et al. 1978), which likely leads to a lower
likelihood of approaching decisions actively, because
expending effort would be seen as useless. Anhedonia and
decisional passivity may also reinforce one another.
Decisional passivity is likely to cause a variety of negative
outcomes; the accumulation of such outcomes can lead to
reduced expectation of positive events or pleasure.
Findings from studies of decisions and regret have shown
that depressed individuals are especially likely to regret
their decisions (Monroe et al. 2005; Schwartz et al. 2002), a
tendency that may also contribute to decisional passivity.
Anticipatory regret likely serves as a warning mechanism,
protecting a decision-maker from bad decisions and
prompting him or her to re-evaluate possible alternatives.
Inappropriate or excessive regret can thereby impair future
decision-making. Given the common tendency of people to
experience more regret for active, rather than passive,
choices (Ritov and Baron 1995), anticipatory regret may
bias a person towards inaction. People may believe, irra-
tionally, that by accepting a default choice passively, they
are avoiding making a decision and thereby minimizing
their responsibility for the outcomes of that choice.
Although some aspects of depressed persons’ decision-
making processes have been shown to differ from those of
the nondepressed, little research has been directed at the
important related question of whether depressed individu-
als make good decisions, that is, decisions that ultimately
serve their best interests. The purpose of Study 1 was to
determine whether depressive symptoms are associated
with the quality, or productivity, of decisions, as well as
with features of decision-making processes that can affect
the quality of decisions. Extrapolating from the research
cited thus far, some of these features, such as tolerance for
uncertainty or ambiguity, risk-seeking, perception of
resources, or passivity, are expected to be affected by
depression and to influence decision making. Other fea-
tures, such as analytical thinking (employment of good
decision-making practices) or information gathering, are
known to impact decision-making; whether they are asso-
ciated with depressive symptoms is not yet well
understood.
Of specific interest are the decisions depressed people
make in their own lives, as well as consequences of these
decisions. Because depressed individuals may decide dif-
ferently when faced with an abstract, as opposed to a real-
life, task (Young and Bentall 1995), and to enhance the
ecological validity of the study, hypothetical real-life sit-
uations that call for a decision were used in this study.
Hypothetical scenarios from the Means-Ends Problem
Solving test (MEPS; Platt and Spivack 1975) have previ-
ously been used in research on depressed individuals, and
difficulties with their problem-solving process were
reported (Marx et al. 1992; Wierzbicki 1984; though see
also Doerfler et al. 1984, and Joffe et al. 1990). Unlike the
MEPS test, on which participants are asked to arrive at an
outcome specified by the test, the scenarios used in this
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study were open-ended. Participants were therefore free to




One hundred and twenty-five participants were recruited on
the Internet from depression-related discussion groups and
forums, and from a subject pool of participants in per-pay
Web-based studies. Participants were mostly female
(64.8%), and their average age was 36.2 (SD = 11.2).
Almost two-thirds of the participants (64.8%) reported
having been given a diagnosis of depression in the past,
39.2% were currently taking antidepressant medications, and
28.0% were currently seeing a therapist for their depression.
Materials
The Beck Depression Inventory-II (BDI; Beck et al. 1996)
is a standard and widely-used 21-item self-report measure
of depressive symptoms. Question 9, which assesses for
suicide risk, was removed from the scale in compliance
with the suggestion of the University of Pennsylvania
Institutional Review Board. This limited the possible range
of the BDI to 0–60. The average BDI score in the sample
was 23.3 (SD = 16.1; range = 0–56).
The Decisions and Reasons Questionnaire, developed for
this study, consisted of six short scenarios, covering social,
career-related, potential conflict, self-improvement, family,
and relationship situations, each of which calls for a decision.
For each scenario, participants were asked to write (free
response) their choice of action and the reason(s) for the
choice. Then, they were asked to indicate whether they had
any past experiences in similar situations. If a past experi-
ence was noted, follow-up questions assessed whether the
decision that was made in the prior situation was the same or
different from the one indicated for the hypothetical sce-
nario. Lastly, participants described, in a free-response
mode, the outcome of the past decision.
A coding system was applied to the free-response
answers of the Decisions and Reasons Questionnaire.
Responses were scored by two Master’s level raters (Y.L.
and C.S.R.) blind to the participant’s depression score or
current treatment status. Responses were scored based on:
– The manualized scoring system
– The participant’s idiosyncratic responses, such that the
score could be adjusted to reflect the participant’s
unique situation.
The scoring approach was modeled on the Ways of
Responding questionnaire (Barber and DeRubeis 1989). As
the free responses varied widely in content, not every
dimension could be rated for each response. Thus, a two-
step process was applied for each response: one rater
identified scorable dimensions, then both raters scored the
identified dimensions, and the two scores were averaged.
For each scenario, the decision and the reasons for that
decision were rated on 11 dimensions described below, on
a 5-point Likert scale. Dimensions that were selected were
deemed to be both relevant to decision-making and likely
to be influenced by depressive symptoms. The dimensions
were:
1. Productivity—the evaluator’s rating of the likelihood
that the outcome of the decision would ultimately be
in the person’s best interest. Although the scoring
was manualized, for productivity ratings the evalu-
ators were particularly mindful of the participant’s
unique situation. For instance, in general, attending a
party with a mindset to enjoy oneself and to engage
actively with other guests (Scenario 3) would be
considered an optimal response. However, if a
participant reports that s/he consistently has severe
panic attacks every time s/he goes out in public, a
polite refusal might be a better choice, unless s/he
chooses to attend while undergoing panic disorder
treatment (even of the self-initiated variety) for the
purpose of a therapy homework experiment and/or
exposure.
2. Activity required—the degree of effort a person
could be expected to expend as a result of the
decision.
3. Risk seeking—the amount of risk, stated or implied,
potentially involved in the decision.
4. Resolution of ambiguity—the likelihood that the
decision will resolve an apparent ambiguity.
5. Information gathering—the degree of the desire,
stated or implied, for the pursuit of additional
information.
6. Existing resources—the perception of the availability
of resources, including assistance from other people
or the respondents’ own talents.
7. Aggression vs. Prosociality—an expression of, or
desire for, either good will or ill will towards others.
8. Optimism—the degree of positivity regarding
expected future events or outcomes.
9. Positive self-reference—the degree of positivity in
self-referring statements.
10. Analytical thinking—an indication of the use of
adaptive thinking strategies, e.g., evaluation of all
options, following useful decision-making rules,
thinking rationally.
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11. Emotionality—the negativity or positivity of the
emotional tone apparent in the response.
Productivity, Activity Required, and Analytical thinking
were rated most frequently, as virtually every response could
be judged on these dimensions. Reliability for the identifi-
cation of a response as ratable or not ratable on a given
dimension was high (Cohen’s kappa coefficients = 0.85).
Intra-class correlations were calculated to estimate reli-
abilities for scores assigned to ratable dimensions; these
ranged from 0.78 to 0.96, indicative of good-to-excellent
reliability. To create composite dimension scores, non-
missing scores were averaged across all scenarios for each
dimension. The correlations between pairs of decision-
making process variables (#2 – #11 above) ranged from
negligible (|0.01|) to high (|0.81|), with a median of |0.32|.
Across all six scenarios, most respondents (from a low of
63% on the least ratable dimension to over 99% on the four
most ratable dimensions, median = 91%) provided
responses that could be rated. For each individual scenario,
the percentages of responses that could be rated were lower
(from 17% on the least ratable dimension to 97% on the two
most ratable; median = 32%), as expected.
The responses regarding the outcomes of decisions made
in real-life situations that resembled the decision scenarios
were rated on a 3-point Likert scale (1 = Negative, 2 =
Neutral, 3 = Positive) by both raters, averaged between
evaluators, and averaged across the six scenarios. The ICC
of the rating of the outcomes of past decisions was 0.83. All
reliabilities were estimated based on two raters, both of
whom rated protocols from the first 74 participants.
Results
Relationship to Depression
BDI scores were strongly and significantly correlated with
ratings of reduced activity (r = -0.52, P \ 0.001),
reduced perception of existing resources (r = -0.47,
P \ 0.001), lower optimism (r = -0.58, P \ 0.001),
lower self-appraisal (r = -0.28, P \ 0.01), and higher
negative emotionality (r = -0.35, P \ 0.005). BDI scores
were also significantly related to lower risk-seeking (r =
-0.23, P \ 0.02), lower likelihood of ambiguity resolution
(r = -0.30, P \ 0.001), reduced information gathering
(r = -0.44, P \ 0.001), and lower prosociality (r =
-0.33, P \ 0.001). Importantly, BDI scores were also
strongly associated with lower productivity of decisions
(r = -0.53, P \ 0.001) and poorer analytical thinking
(r = -0.48, P \ 0.001), indicating that individuals with
greater depressive symptomatology appeared to be making
their decisions in either a sub-optimal or maladaptive
fashion, resulting in poorer decisions. All but two of the
above correlations remained significant when controlling
for those demographic (age, gender) and/or current treat-
ment (current antidepressant use, current psychotherapy)
variables that were significantly related to the respective
dimension. The associations between the BDI and Self-
appraisal (r = -0.17, P \ 0.14) and Risk-seeking (r =
-0.16, P \ 0.12) became nonsignificant.
Because a sub-optimal approach to decisions is likely to
impact the productivity of decisions negatively, we con-
ducted tests to determine whether the data were consistent
with a hypothesis that Analytical thinking scores mediate
the relationship between BDI scores and productivity
scores. Analytical thinking scores were entered into a
regression model that predicted productivity from BDI
scores. Although the relationship of BDI to productivity
remained significant (t(118) = -2.99, P \ 0.005), the
unstandardized beta was reduced from b = -0.03 to
b = -0.01, indicative of partial mediation. A Sobel test
confirmed the significance of the test for mediation (Z =
-5.35, P \ .001).
Past Decisions
A strong association between BDI scores and ratings of
past outcomes was obtained, such that participants with
higher BDI scores also reported poorer outcomes of their
past decisions (b = -.02, t(120) = -5.47, P \ 0.001),
even when we controlled statistically for the number of
scenarios about which participants reported past outcomes.
Interestingly, when facing a similar current problem,
individuals with higher BDI scores more often chose
decisions that had previously resulted in negative outcomes
(b = .01, t(120) = 2.72, P \ 0.01), even when we con-
trolled for the proportion of past outcomes they reported to
have been negative. This provides additional evidence for
the reduced capacity to evaluate one’s options carefully,
and, perhaps, reduced ability to learn from one’s prior
decision-making experiences.
Discussion
The purpose of this study was to characterize the decision-
making processes that are related to depressive symptom
severity. Several interesting relationships between depres-
sive symptoms and features of decision-making were
revealed. Some of the observed relationships could be
anticipated given the features and deficits that have been
documented in depression, including the pessimistic out-
look on life and a predominance of negative emotions (e.g.,
Abramson et al. 1978, 1989). In our study, both pessimism
and negative emotionality were correlated with the
depression symptoms. As predicted by Leahy’s Portfolio
model, individuals with a greater level of depression
336 Cogn Ther Res (2011) 35:333–341
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symptoms were also found to perceive fewer resources as
being available to them, though risk-aversion, another facet
of the model, was not a strong correlate of depressive
symptoms. Similarly, the tendency of depressed persons to
be unwilling to take an active approach to decisions might
be predicted given the lack on energy and reduced moti-
vation frequently observed in depressed individuals.
Some of the other observed relationships were not
directly predictable from what is known about depressed
individuals, and may therefore provide new insights into
the deficits in decision-making of depressed individuals.
Most important among these were the strong negative
associations found between depressive symptoms and the
productivity of decisions, as well as between depression
and the quality of the decision making process (i.e., degree
of analytic thinking). Thus, individuals with greater
depressive symptomatology used fewer adaptive strategies
in making their decisions and, likely because of that,
decisions they made were likely to be less productive.
These findings were further supported by the associations
between depressive symptoms and reduced search for
information as well as a decreased likelihood that a deci-
sion will resolve ambiguities or uncertainties.
The inference that decision-making processes of depres-
sed individuals are maladaptive is reinforced by the apparent
readiness of depressed persons to choose an alternative that
has already failed them at least once. A related finding—that
depressed individuals reported worse outcomes of past
decisions—may be explained by the general tendency to
evaluate situations in a negative, pessimistic manner.
However, repeating a strategy that had failed in the past
cannot be similarly explained. Even if the past outcome was
objectively better than was perceived by the depressed
individual, inasmuch as its perception was negative, this
should be expected to inform subsequent decisions. Instead,
the reverse was true for those with greater depression scores.
Naturally, making the same decision as a previously failed
one may be warranted in some situations, for example if
circumstances have changed, however, there is no good
reason why this would be more likely to occur with indi-
viduals who have more depressive symptoms.
Study 2
The results of the Study 1 suggest that individuals with
greater depressive symptoms make less productive deci-
sions and engage fewer adaptive decision-making strate-
gies. A possible conclusion, especially in light of results
from the meditation analysis, is that a general failure to use
good strategies was chiefly responsible for the poor quality
of the decisions. Alternatives include the possibilities that
depressed individuals judge the expected utility of
outcomes differently from nondepressed, or that they have
different goals for their decisions. If depressed individuals
value different outcomes, their decisions would be different
from those of non-depressed persons, even if they use good
decision-making strategies.
Study 2 was undertaken to evaluate the outcomes of the
decisions separate from the use of good decision-making
strategies, using a quasi-experimental rather than a statistical
approach. The same hypothetical scenarios presented in
Study 1 were used to elicit decisions from participants.
However, key aspects of the participants’ decision-making
process were controlled via instructions that guided them
through the steps of deciding, thus ensuring that all partici-
pants used the same decision-making tools. Observing, once
again, a strong relationship between the level of depressive
symptoms and the productivity of decisions would suggest
that the poorer choices of depressed persons are due to
aspects of decision-making other than poor decision strate-
gies. Alternatively, if no relationship is found between
depressive symptoms and productivity of decisions, the
hypothesis that the lack of sound decision-making strategies
is responsible for the poor decisions of those with more
depressive symptoms would receive support. As a further
test of these hypotheses, we evaluated whether individual
differences in decision-relevant goals could be explained by
variations in depressive symptom levels.
Methods
Participants
Using the same recruitment methods as in Study 1, 109
individuals participated in the study. Participants were
mostly women (82.6%), with an average age of 40.2
(SD = 10.6). Less than half (41.3%) reported having been
given a diagnosis of depression in the past, 25.7% were
currently taking antidepressants, and 17.4% were currently
seeing a therapist.
Materials
Beck Depression Inventory-II (BDI; Beck et al. 1996), with
item 9 removed as in Study 1, was used to measure the par-
ticipants’ level of depression. The average BDI score of the
sample was 13.8 (SD = 12.1), ranging from 0 to 48. That
participants in Study 2 are less depressed than in Study 1 is
likely due to the relative differences of recruitment channels:
whereas in Study 1 most participants were recruited from the
online forums and newsgroups, participants in Study 2 were
mostly recruited from the per-pay study pool.
The Thinking about Decisions Questionnaire, developed
for this study, was used to evaluate the participants’ decision-
making. The questionnaire was based on the same six
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scenarios used in Study 1, and was designed to prompt par-
ticipants to think carefully about the decisions. For each
scenario, participants were asked to make their decisions
according to the steps cognitive-behavioral therapists (Beck
1995) and practitioners of Problem Solving Therapy (Nezu
et al. 2007) often use to help clients with decisions, as
follows:
1. Generate all options that might be realistic for a given
scenario.
2. Rank-order the options, from their favorite (the one
they would actually choose) to their least favorite.
Satisfaction with their favorite choice was then rated
on a 7-point Likert scale.
3. Think about their first and second option (most favorite
and the runner-up), and list positive and negative
features of one as compared to the other.
4. Report whether they would want to change their mind
about their order of options, given this deliberation.
Satisfaction with the final decision was reassessed on a
7-point Likert scale.
A scoring system for the free-response question was
developed. Quality of participants’ decisions was assessed
by rating the options generated by the participants on the
Productivity dimension (as in Study 1). The positive and
negative features of the two favorite options were catego-
rized into five ‘‘Sought’’ features and five ‘‘Avoided’’
features. The ‘‘Sought’’ group described the features of
options that participants seemed to prefer or seek out, and
contained five categories: Being proactive, Good outcome,
Social benefits, Resources, and Feeling better. The
‘‘Avoided’’ group contained the features that participants
seemed to dislike and eschew, and also consisted of five
categories: Costs, Anxiety, Feeling bad (e.g., uncomfort-
able, or disappointed), Social problems, and Failure. When
responses fit into more than one category, all applicable
categories were noted.
Responses were coded by two independent Master’s
level raters (Y.L. and C.S.R.), blind to the participants’
depression score or current treatment status. Both raters
scored responses from 30 participants to evaluate the reli-
ability of ratings. The ICCs for ratings of Productivity was
0.84. The Cohen’s kappa coefficients for the Sought sub-
groups ranged from 0.77 to 0.89, and from 0.80 to 0.92 for
Avoided subgroups.
Results
Relationship to Depressive Symptoms
There was no significant association between depressive
symptoms and the number of options participants had
generated (r = 0.06, P \ .57).
With an exception of the desire to avoid anxiety
(b = .04, t(107) = 4.57, P \ 0.0001, still significant after
controlling for relevant demographic and treatment vari-
ables), no other regression predicting decisional consider-
ations (aspects of decisions that participants sought and
those they were trying to avoid) from BDI was significant
(Table 1). These findings suggest that decision goals do not
vary based on the severity of depressive symptoms. How-
ever, BDI scores were associated with the reduced satis-
faction with decisions, both with the initial decision and the
final, post-deliberation decision (r = 0.26, P \ 0.01, and
r = 0.23, P \ 0.03, respectively).
Does Using Decision Tools Help Productivity of
Decisions? Comparing the Results of Study 1 and Study 2
Although the ranges of BDI scores were similar between
the two studies, participants in Study 2 did not report as
much depressive symptomatology, on average, as those in
Study 1 (t(232) = 5.02, P \ 0.001, d = 0.66). To make
the results of the two studies comparable, we used a
regression model as described below, to predict produc-
tivity of decisions from BDI scores and estimate unstan-
dardized betas. Unstandardized betas are preferable
because, unlike correlation coefficients: (1) they do not rely
on the variance of the variables (which differed between
the two studies) to estimate relationships, and (2) they rely
on units of measurements as measured, rather than stan-
dardizing them, which makes comparisons of uneven dis-
tributions possible (i.e., 1 unit of BDI of distribution A is
the same as 1 unit of BDI in distribution B).
The datasets from Study 1 and Study 2 were combined
for a quasi-experimental joint analysis. To show the dif-
ference between the association of depression and pro-
ductivity between the two studies, regression slopes of
productivity as a function of BDI scores for the two studies
Table 1 Regression models: BDI predicting decisional
considerations
b SE t DF P-value
Sought
Good outcome .02 .01 1.65 107 .10
Proactive .00 .01 .06 107 .95
Social benefits -.01 .01 -.43 107 .67
Resources .00 .01 .15 107 .88
Feel better .01 .01 1.15 107 .25
Avoided
Costs -.01 .01 -.78 107 .44
Anxiety .04 .01 4.57 107 .0001
Feeling bad .00 .01 .39 107 .72
Social problems .02 .02 .97 107 .34
Failure .02 .01 1.31 107 .20
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were compared. A significant interaction of the BDI scores
and Study in predicting productivity would indicate a dif-
ference between the regression slopes obtained in Study 1
and that of Study 2. The results of a regression model
indeed revealed a significant interaction of BDI scores and
Study in predicting productivity, t(230) = 3.16, P \ .002,
R2 = .27, F(3, 230) = 28.19, P \ .0001 (Fig. 1). Simple
slope analyses revealed that the slope was significant for
the sample in Study 1 (b = -.03, t(230) = -7.99,
P \ 0.001), but not significant for the sample in Study 2
(b = -.01, t(230) = -1.78, P \ .08). The unstandardized
betas and the variance explained by BDI scores were
considerably lower in Study 2 compared to Study 1
(Fig. 1). Including relevant demographic and treatment
variables in the regression model did not alter the results.
Discussion
The results from Study 2 suggest that once individuals
were prompted to use good decision-making strategies, few
associations between decision-related variables and the
depression scores were found. Of the decisional consider-
ations indicated by participants, only one—desire to avoid
anxiety—was found to be predicted by depressive symp-
toms. Depression scores likewise were not related to par-
ticipants’ ability to generate possible alternative behaviors
for given decision situations. These results suggest that
priorities and goals of depressed individuals, as well as
their ability to use decision tools, may not differ from those
of the nondepressed. Importantly, prompting the utilization
of decision strategies seemed to improve the ability of
depressed individuals to make productive decisions. Thus,
of the two competing hypotheses discussed above, the
findings are more consistent with the possibility that
depressive deficits in decision making result from a failure
to employ adaptive decision tools.
Associations between depression and satisfaction about
decisions were also found. These findings are not surpris-
ing given the bias toward negative thinking, and the
selective attention toward the negative, that have been
documented in depression.
General Discussion
The two studies described in this report were designed to
accomplish several goals. The first goal was to characterize
the associations between the level of depressive symp-
tomatology and decision-related attitudes and approaches.
In addition to predictable differences, the findings sug-
gested that individuals with greater levels of depressive
symptoms seek out less information to help them with
problem-solving and make use of fewer resources. They
are also less likely to engage decisions that would resolve
an ambiguity, which may be reflective of poor decision
making skills, as well as perhaps of greater tolerance of
ambiguous or uncertain situations. Second, a hypothesis
that depression scores are associated with the goodness of
decisions was tested. The results confirm an inverse rela-
tionship between depression and goodness of decisions,
such that those that are more depressed make less pro-
ductive decisions. This was corroborated by the inverse
relationship found between depression scores and self-
reported goodness of past outcomes, as well as the finding
of an increased likelihood of using a previously failed
strategy in a similar situation.
Third, the studies were meant to distinguish between
two competing hypotheses: 1. the relationship between
depressive symptoms and goodness of decisions is due to
poor decision-making skills, or 2. the said relationship is
due to other factors, such as differences in goals or values.
Findings from Study 2, in which we provided participants
with a common set of decision-making tools, suggest that
depressed individuals make poorer decisions because they
fail to use adaptive decision-making strategies. Once good
strategies were employed, the productivity of decisions of
the more depressed participants converged with those of
the less-depressed. Furthermore, there were no significant
associations found between the participants’ goals for
decisions and their level of depression, with the exception
of a desire to avoid anxiety. It is possible that wishing to
eschew anxiety causes depressed individuals to avoid
decisions that are potentially ambitious or risky. Based on
the findings of Study 2, however, whatever influence
anxiety might have on decision-making can be reversed by
using good decision practices.
The results from these two studies offer support to the
usefulness of some of the techniques used in Cognitive-
Behavioral Therapy (CBT) for depression. In assisting their
R2 = 0.04 
R2 = 0.30 
Fig. 1 Regression slopes of BDI scores predicting productivity,
grouped by study
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clients with decisions, CBT practitioners encourage the use
of tools such as Pros/Cons lists, examining several sides of
the issue, and creatively generating options for action—all
in the attempt to engage more thoughtful and productive
decision-making (Beck 1995). A similar approach is used
to address errors of judgment, such as jumping to conclu-
sions. A therapist might encourage patients to think about
issues more rationally and guide them through a more
adaptive thought process. Problem Solving Therapy (PST;
Nezu et al. 1989) is another therapeutic approach that
addresses decision-making as a specific target of inter-
vention. Research into CBT and PST demonstrated their
efficacy vis-a`-vis reduction of depressive symptoms;
however, there is little research showing that techniques
used in these treatments improve the actual decisions. Our
findings suggest that those with higher depressive symp-
toms have specific deficits in decision-making and make
poorer choices, and that these choices could be improved
by the tools similar to those provided by the above treat-
ments. A question future research may address is whether
improvements in decision-making mediates treatment
success in CBT or PST.
These studies have several limitations. Due to the reli-
ance on convenience sampling, the studies differed in the
average level of depression reported by participants. Fur-
thermore, although the analysis in which data from the two
studies were combined into one dataset treated the studies
as two conditions in an experiment, it was quasi-experi-
mental. Any conclusions drawn from the comparisons
between the two samples should therefore be interpreted
with caution. Although the raters were blind to the par-
ticipant’s depression status, and every effort was made to
keep the ratings unbiased, aided by the manualized rating
guides, it is possible that the depression status of partici-
pants could have been revealed through either the emo-
tional tone of the response or through participants’
inadvertent comments. However, this limitation would
concern only the results of Study 1, with its significant
relationships between depression scores and decision-
related issues. Because the studies were conducted on the
Web, depression levels were assessed via self-report, rather
than via a clinical interview, and the presence of other
symptoms or diagnoses that could affect decision-making
was not assessed. Finally, the main variable of interest—
productivity of a decision—reflects the degree of benefit a
person might be expected to derive from making that
decision in a hypothetical scenario. They therefore may
only approximate the decisions participants might make in
a real-life situation, or the benefit they might derive from
that decision in a real-life situation.
Insofar as the choices a person makes throughout his or
her life shape future outcomes, both in trivial matters and
in those of considerable importance, the deficits in
decision-making exhibited by depressed individuals are
troubling. Bad decisions and the negative experiences
resulting from them are likely to reinforce the already
negative view depressed people hold of themselves and
their abilities. Bad choices may also generate feelings of
guilt for past failures, and support the feeling of hope-
lessness, as depressed individuals see themselves as being
unable to make a positive impact on their future. Recog-
nizing their difficulty with making decisions, they are
likely to turn to avoidance of decisions as a coping strat-
egy. This tendency is likely to lead to further missed
opportunities, disappointments, and more negative out-
comes overall. However, this work has shown that the
ability to make sound decisions is not lost, as it can be
brought back with a relatively simple manipulation, sug-
gesting that teaching decision-making techniques in treat-
ment and encouraging their use may be particularly
productive for depressed individuals. Understanding the
decision-making processes of depressed individuals and of
those with other forms of psychopathology, can provide
tools for clinicians, help people improve their lives, and
enhance our understanding of the phenomenology of psy-
chological disorders.
Open Access This article is distributed under the terms of the
Creative Commons Attribution Noncommercial License which per-
mits any noncommercial use, distribution, and reproduction in any
medium, provided the original author(s) and source are credited.
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